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Abstract: Governance researchers have repeatedly discussed how to make public governance more
accountable given the relatively ‘thin’ accountability of representative government. Recent decades
have seen the growth of new, compensatory forms of accountability. However, these measures do
not seem have satisfied the demands for strengthening public sector accountability. Drawing on the
concept of social accountability, this article challenges common wisdom in arguing that collaborative
governance may enhance public governance accountability, although it also raises new accountability
problems that must be tackled. The article develops a heuristic framework for empirical studies of
accountability, which improves the impact of collaborative forms of governance.
Keywords: representative democracy; public accountability; social accountability; collaborative
governance; metagovernance
1. Introduction
Heeding the call for positive public administration research (Compton et al. 2021;
Douglas et al. 2021), this prospective review article aims to explore how and under which
conditions collaborative governance may help to secure accountable government by fa-
cilitating high-quality, dialogue-based exchanges between public authorities and societal
stakeholders, including citizens, local neighborhoods, civic organisations etc. (Dillard and
Vinnari 2019)
Exploring how collaborative governance may improve public sector accountability is
crucial since the traditional institutions of representative democracy provide relatively thin
accountability (Schillemans 2008; Warren 2014). Public institutions have rules and proce-
dures that secure some level of government transparency, and they offer opportunities for
mass media and the general public to scrutinize what elected and non-elected public offi-
cials do and how they do it. Citizens have constitutional rights to vote in regular elections,
where they can express their dissatisfaction with incumbent governments. Nevertheless,
there are limited opportunities for public authorities to give thorough, non-technical and
issue-specific accounts of public governance and for citizens to ask questions and evaluate
such accounts in order to pass judgements and pose sanctions. Moreover, in representative
democracy, voters are asked to make grand ‘synoptic’ judgments (Lindblom 1979) about
how their elected representative is likely to act across a wide range of complex policy issues
in the next four or five years. Occasionally, they use their vote to protest against particular
decisions, but the voting procedure provides a poor means of political communication
between voters and politicians. Governments seldom know exactly why they either won
or lost an election (Fung 2015).
The relatively thin accountability accruing from the institutional mechanisms of rep-
resentative government may have been enough to secure democratic legitimacy in times
dominated by an allegiant political culture characterized by high levels of trust in the
wisdom of government (Dalton and Welzel 2014). In today’s advanced representative
democracies, however, the thin forms of accountability appear to be insufficient to satisfy an
increasingly competent, critical and assertive citizenry that is nurtured by public education,
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a mediatized drama democracy and the rise of new social media (Dalton and Welzel 2014;
Esser and Strömbäck 2014; Neblo et al. 2010; Norris 2011).
Over the last 40 years, this shift in political culture has placed governments under
growing pressure to account for their governing. In response, they have introduced differ-
ent supplementary accountability measures, including administrative, legal and political
auditing (supreme auditing institutions), open government initiatives (e.g., ombudsmen,
open access, whistle-blowers), performance management systems (league-tables, key per-
formance indicators), independent monitoring agencies (think tanks, watchdogs) and
different voice and exit options for public service users (user boards, free service choice)
(Bovens and Wille 2020; Bovens et al. 2014b; Keane 2009; Pierre et al. 2018; Power 1997;
Salamon 2002; Sørensen 1997). However, the new accountability measures have not re-
duced the demand for further efforts to strengthen public sector accountability (Bovens et al.
2014b; Lægreid 2014; Shkabatur 2012). In addition, the new accountability measures may
not be delivering what is needed. There have been mounting criticisms of the new public
auditing and monitoring systems for suppressing innovation, failing to address the big
problems, stimulating window dressing, enhancing bureaucracy and imposing increasing
costs on public organizations (Kells 2011). Finally, on a deeper theoretical level, the problem
is that the supplementary accountability measures are based on a fundamental distrust,
meaning that government agencies tend to become more guarded and self-protective, and
thus less open to scrutiny.
Consequently, we suggest that the route to strengthening public sector accountability
in advanced representative democracies is not to invent more of the current mechanisms
for transparency, oversight and sanctioning (see Honig and Pritchett 2019). Surely, the
public access to information about government performance and the possibility for citizens
to evaluate, judge and sanction such performance through regular elections provides
indispensable support for the answerability of government. However, if we want to
‘thicken’ public accountability by making it more precise and issue-specific, trust-based
and founded on shared norms, values and obligations, we must enhance the interaction
between the public sector and relevant social and economic actors. Enhanced interaction
will enable government agencies to explain their governance outputs and public value
outcomes to societal stakeholders and allow the latter to ask pertinent questions, effectively
communicate critical opinions and ensure government responsiveness (see Dubnick 2003;
Honig and Pritchett 2019). Hence, as we define it, thick accountability refers to a dialogical
accountability relationship in which: (1) account givers have both capacity and opportunity
to provide precise and adequate accounts about particular governance decisions and the
mission-related results that are obtained; and (2) account holders have both skills and
competences to critically assess and sanction these accounts vis-à-vis a broad set of norms,
values and obligations. Performing these roles in thick accountability processes requires
mutual trust, since account givers will not provide an honest account of things if they
do not trust the account holders to make a fair judgement, which in turn depends on the
account holder trusting that the account is complete (Hardin 2002).
The argument advanced in this paper is that collaborative governance in networks
and partnerships can promote a new type of social accountability that helps to hold govern-
ments to account for their deeds (Bianchi et al. 2021; Fox 2015; Sørensen and Torfing 2020).
Collaborative governance brings together public actors and private stakeholders in a shared
effort to solve complex societal problems in a turbulent world and to create governance
solutions and outcomes that have value to the public and in public values (Ansell and
Gash 2008; Emerson et al. 2012). Ideally, collaborative interaction involves trust-based
knowledge sharing, joint exploration of problems and solutions, compromises and agree-
ments about joint action, critical scrutiny of the impact of new governance initiatives, and
responsive discussions of problems and failures, and thus the need for future adjustments
and revisions. The empowered participation of intensely affected actors helps to ensure
that lay actors are heard in the design phase and able to scrutinize results. Procedures
for deliberation based on reasoned debate and passionate argumentation tend to enhance
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the fairness of policy processes. Finally, joint scrutiny and mutual learning processes help
to correct and improve public governance solutions. Hence, collaborative governance
may strengthen public accountability while simultaneously enhancing input, throughput
and output legitimacy. Empirical evidence shows that collaborative governance may lead
to better governance solutions (Doberstein 2016), enhanced government accountability
vis-à-vis stakeholders (Roberts 2002; Schillemans 2011) and more democratic legitimacy
(2017). The conditions for collaborative governance to produce such desirable outcomes
have been studied by Mattessich and Monsey (1992) and, more recently, in empirical case
studies reported to the Collaborative Governance Data Bank (Douglas et al. 2020).
We realize that, in real life, collaborative governance often involves empowered sub-
elites rather than ordinary citizens who frequently lack time, resources and motivation to
participate (see Ghose 2005), although active inclusion management creating incentives,
interdependencies and mutual trust may get them on board (Ansell et al. 2020). We suggest,
however, that these sub-elites play a key role in connecting government and citizens and in
enhancing public governance accountability (Etzioni-Halevy 1993; Esmark 2007). Hence,
by participating in collaborative governance processes, sub-elites assist ordinary citizens in
making measured and realistic assessments and judgements of the public accounts they
gain access to. They may even have the capacity to put pressure on public authorities to
improve both the quality of public accounts and the performance of public governance by
mobilizing mass media and groups of affected citizens.
The crux of the argument is that collaborative governance processes based on the par-
ticipation of competent, critical and engaged sub-elites can serve as ‘enabling environments’
(Fox 2015) for advancing public governance accountability in advanced representative
democracies. Areas pertaining to national security or public contracting may provide
notable exceptions, and active involvement of citizens in collaborative governance arrange-
ments aiming to hold public decision-makers to account tends to be more frequent at the
local level than the regional, national or transnational levels; here, sub-elites will have to
act on their behalf.
Although collaborative governance holds a promise of enhancing public sector ac-
countability, we should not forget that collaborative governance raises just as many ac-
countability problems as it solves (Schillemans 2008). As widely recognized in governance
research, collaborative governance arrangements are notoriously difficult to hold to account
because they come with a certain degree of opaqueness, secrecy and informality (Klijn 2014).
It can sometimes be difficult for external audiences to obtain the information required to
scrutinize and pass judgement on process, outputs and outcomes, determining who is
responsible for governance failure is particularly hard, and there is no clear way of sanc-
tioning collaborative networks of more or less self-appointed actors; although naming and
shaming the collaborative arena is an option (Damgaard and Lewis 2014; de Fine Licht and
Naurin 2016; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014; Papadopoulos 2007; Sørensen and Torfing 2020).
We must therefore find viable ways to enhance the accountability of collaborative gover-
nance processes; and once again, the concept of social accountability may be of value.
This article contributes to the scholarship on public accountability by developing a
heuristic stages model showing how collaborative governance may enhance government
accountability. The structure of the argument is as follows. First, we define public ac-
countability and critically evaluate the ‘thin’ accountability provided by the institutions of
representative government. Next, we provide a brief overview of the efforts to improve
public governance accountability in recent decades and reflect on their limitations. We then
show how collaborative governance may enhance social accountability, thereby contribut-
ing to the ‘thickening’ of public governance accountability in advanced liberal democracies.
After considering and solving the accountability problems associated with collaborative
governance by invoking the ideas inherent to social accountability, we present a heuristic
framework for studying how collaborative forms of governance affect public accountability.
We conclude by summarizing the key messages.
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2. Public Governance Accountability in Representative Democracy
Accountability is one of the normative pillars of representative democracy because
it allows citizens to control elected politicians and, through them, the public employ-
ees responsible for implementing public solutions (Behn 2001; Lührmann et al. 2020;
Warren 2014). According to widely accepted global standards, a political system that fails
to provide structures and procedures enabling citizens to critically assess what elected
officials and public authorities are doing and to punish or reward them accordingly is not
a democracy (Freedom House 2020; V-DEM Institute 2021). Accountable government is a
democratic prerequisite.
There is some debate about what accountability entails more precisely. Drawing
on the minimum definition in the introductory chapter of the Oxford Handbook of Public
Accountability (Bovens et al. 2014a), the term refers to an actor who is answerable to another
actor with a legitimate claim to demand information and explanation, pass judgement
and impose sanctions. Public accountability then refers to an accountability relationship
between those who govern and those who are governed within the public domain.
Although there is considerable variation between models of representative democ-
racy, they all provide horizontal and vertical mechanisms for making public authori-
ties answerable to each other and to the public (Lührmann et al. 2020). Building on De
Montesquieu’s ([1748] 1989) call for a separation of powers, the horizontal accountabil-
ity mechanisms take the form of checks and balances between relatively autonomous
branches of government, such as the judiciary, executive and legislative powers (more
recently including ombudsman institutions). Horizontal accountability assumes that an
authoritative power holder must be controlled by another authoritative power in order
to prevent the usurpation of power by a single power holder (Breuer and Leininger 2021;
O’Donnell 1998; Schillemans 2008, 2011). The vertical accountability mechanisms come
in the shape of formal rules and procedures that secure some level of transparency of
political and administrative processes and outcomes pertaining to public policy, regulation
and service delivery. A free public sphere with independent media provides citizens with
information and opportunities to debate the process and outcomes of public governance
and force politicians and other public actors to explain themselves. Moreover, admin-
istrative complaint systems grant citizens the right to challenge government decisions,
and, perhaps most importantly, regular elections provide the means to penalize or reward
government and opposition parties for the role they have played in governing society
and the economy. The basic assumption behind these institutional arrangements is that
accountability is a product of a principal–agency relationship wherein citizens delegate
power to elected politicians and public managers, subsequently holding them accountable
for the outputs and outcomes they produce and deliver (Gailmard 2014; Ingham 2019;
Lührmann et al. 2020; Warren 2014). This assumption has roots in protective democracy
that claims that elected government officials who are spending revenues accruing from
taxation should be accountable to the citizens who are paying taxes (Christiano 2018;
Held 2006; Joshi 2013).
Although the traditional accountability mechanisms in representative government
do indeed promote public sector accountability, there are clear limitations. The horizon-
tal accountability mechanisms might be quite effective, but they merely provide checks
and balances between different public authorities and do not involve the general public.
Vertical accountability mechanisms typically involve the general public, but tend to give
citizens relatively few opportunities to scrutinize government action, pass judgements and
sanction bad governance (Ashworth et al. 2017; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw 2020;
Warren 2014). Large parts of government live a secluded life protected by the secrecy acts
and ‘securitization’ of public policy and governance that tend to limit access to information
(White 2002; Wæver 1993). The public accounts accessible to citizens are often technical and
the information that reaches citizens is filtered through elite-dominated media operating
on the basis of particular news criteria. If the citizens are dissatisfied with the incumbent
government, they can write letters to the editor or organize protests forcing the politicians
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to respond to public criticism. This response is often reduced to one-line soundbites in
the media, however, which renders the explanation of complex issues difficult. If citizens
remain dissatisfied with government policy, they can vote for an opposition party in the
next election. The government may lose the election, but it is often unclear whether the
voters disliked a particular policy, were tired of watching the same old faces, or thought
that the opposition offered a better alternative. Hence, elections fail to communicate the
voters’ reasons for voting how they do and leave it to political parties and their professional
staff to interpret the election result based on focus group studies and media debates that are
of varying quality. This reality led Joseph Schumpeter (1942) to claim that representative
democracies do not give citizens the power to control the government, but merely allow
them to elect their rulers. Many years later, Benjamin Barber (1984, p. 221) drew a similar
conclusion when describing representative democracy as ‘thin’ in the sense that it positions
citizens as disempowered spectators to elite rule. Citizens may vote in general elections,
but in deciding which party to vote for they have to judge how elected representatives are
likely to act across a wide range of complex policy issues, thus leaving limited scope for
holding the incumbent government to account for a particular policy failure.
A key factor reducing the public accountability in representative democracies is the
restrictions on the information that politicians and administrators may relay to the public.
Public administrators and their political principals have an interest in hiding administra-
tive inefficiencies and implementation problems, information containing personal data
or pertaining to internal processes cannot be disclosed, and the retrieval of accessible
information is often costly and requires the documentation of affectedness or prior and
precise knowledge of the requested information (Candeub 2013; Graves and Katyal 2020;
White 2002). Moreover, the administrative state has no tradition for documenting adminis-
trative governance outputs and public value outcomes. Horizontal accountability based on
checks and balances between the legislative, executive and judiciary powers secures legal
and fiscal control, but tends to remain an in-house activity, rarely involving those actors
who are affected by bad governance.
Since the 1970s, the traditional accountability mechanisms supplied by the institutions
of representative government have met growing critique for their inability to secure suffi-
cient levels of public control with those in power (Behn 2001; Christensen and Lægreid 2015;
Fatemi and Behmanesh 2012; Whiteley and Kölln 2019). Three strands of critique seem
to point in the same direction, thus strengthening the demand for a more accountable
government. First, neoliberal commentators have criticized the public sector for being inef-
fective and squandering taxpayer money (Lane 1997), and they called for the introduction
of performance management systems to enhance public sector transparency, for example,
by forcing public schools to publicize performance information. Second, mass media
and civil society actors have challenged governments to provide more and better access
to information about government operations (Grimes 2013; Jacobs and Schillemans 2016;
Norris 2014; Sørensen 2020). Finally, the education revolution and anti-authoritarian re-
volt has empowered citizens in the Western world (King 1987), transforming the political
culture from an allegiant to an assertive culture in which a growing number of critical
and competent citizens are ready to confront the governing elites (Dalton and Welzel 2014;
Dudley et al. 2015). The latter has been fueled by the new social media and growing me-
diatization of politics and political communication (Esser and Strömbäck 2014; Park 2013;
Sørensen 2020). In sum, we have witnessed a growing demand for the introduction of new
supplementary accountability mechanisms.
The new vertical forms of accountability include the introduction of elaborate per-
formance management systems that measure and report key performance indicators and
benchmark results through the construction of league tables that enhance transparency
and facilitate public scrutiny (Power 1997). Performance information can be used by ser-
vice users who are given new exit and voice options, allowing them to vote with their
feet by choosing another service provider or be elected to a user board, where they can
raise criticisms and complain about low and inadequate service standards are (Hirst 2000;
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Sørensen 1997; Warren 2011; Holbein and Hassell 2019). The new accountability mecha-
nisms also include the formation of independent monitoring agencies that play a watchdog
role, keeping an eye on what politicians and public agencies are doing and how they are
performing (Keane 2009). A growing number of national and international NGOs are
engaged in monitoring government action in the field of human rights protection, envi-
ronmental issues and social inequality. The UN Sustainable Development Goals provides
an agreed-upon standard for holding governments to account for their actions and comes
with an array of targets and indicators. Finally, the new accountability mechanisms in-
clude Open Government initiatives (Attard et al. 2015; Clarke and Francoli 2014) that give
critical and assertive citizens the right to access government documents and proceedings
in order to allow for effective public oversight, create ombudsman institutions charged
with representing the interests of the public by investigating and addressing complaints
of mal-administration or a violation of rights, and introduce whistle-blower systems that
enable public employees or third parties to disclose secrets and report illegal, unethical or
inappropriate public action without punishment.
These supplementary accountability mechanisms have purported to make the public
sector more transparent and citizens more informed, and they have provided new tools
with which to sanction government agencies and public service institutions between
elections. However, political scientists as well as public administration and governance
scholars have begun doubting that more transparency, oversight and sanctioning tools will
decisively advance government accountability, which is basically what the predominant
principal–agent perspective on accountability seems to suggest. Some scholars argue that
there is a considerable risk that such a strategy will neither strengthen the position of
citizens and private stakeholders vis-à-vis public authorities nor enhance the capacity of
the public sector to respond effectively to the voice of the people (Bovens and Wille 2020;
Bovens et al. 2008; Christensen and Lægreid 2015; Power 1997). Citizens and stakeholders
may drown in the pool of transparent government information and performance data and
may not act on negative performance as the proponents of performance accountability
propose (Holbein and Hassell 2019). At the same time, public, mediatized criticisms of
alleged government failures may merely trigger a self-preserving blame-game that hardly
provides any learning-based corrections (Hood 2010). Consequently, the search is on for a
new perspective on accountability that, in sharp contrast to the principal–agent perspective,
focuses on enhancing the quality of the accountability relationship between the public
sector and the civic and socioeconomic actors in its societal environment.
2.1. Enhancing Public Governance Accountability through Social Accountability
The search for ways of enhancing public governance accountability and granting
the involved actors what Bovens and Wille (2020) denote accountability power can find
valuable inspiration in a social accountability perspective. Social accountability is an
umbrella term for strategies aiming to improve public sector performance via the creation
of productive and synergetic state–civil society interactions (Antlöv and Wetterberg 2021;
Fox 2015; Hickey and King 2016; Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Schatz 2013). As such, a
social accountability perspective claims that a thicker accountability relationship not only
requires that the societal actors aiming to hold public decision-makers to account have the
capacity and resources needed to do so; the public actors who are held to account must
also be bolstered, so that they can provide accessible accounts of often complex decisions
and respond to the issues and criticisms voiced by societal actors.
The idea is that accountability as a product of a mutually empowering relationship res-
onates well with recent developments in theories of collaborative governance, co-creation
and integrative public leadership that tend to view the mobilization and empowerment of
citizens and civil society actors as key means to empower elected governments and the
public sector (Alford 2014; Ansell and Torfing 2021; Burns 2003; Crosby and Bryson 2010;
Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Nye 2008; Osborne 2010). While these strands of research
are mainly interested in how state–society interactions can help to enhance public value
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production based on a ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham and Vangen 2013), they are
much less concerned with strengthening public governance accountability; hence, the good
prospect for a happy marriage between the new theories of collaborative governance and
the social accountability concept.
Jonathan Fox (2015) argues that the key to promoting social accountability is to build
an ‘enabling environment’. Such an environment spurs stakeholder participation and
oversight in relation to specific policy issues, helps to diffuse information about public
performance, and coordinates and integrates the critical assessments of local, regional
and national civil society actors to add teeth to the citizens’ voices. It also provides favor-
able conditions for public authorities to explain their actions and results to relevant and
affected actors and to engage with critical voices and build pro-accountability alliances
that enhance the willingness to accommodate and learn from critical feedback on pub-
lic regulation, governance and service provisions and support and defend reforms that
strengthen cross-boundary collaboration (Fox 2015, p. 355). An enabling environment
bolsters the skills and resources of public actors with respect to explaining themselves in
encounters with competent, critical and assertive citizens and vested social and economic
interests. For politicians, this implies mustering their courage and rhetorical ability to
explain complex, dilemma-filled political decisions based on negotiations and compromise
to the citizens and stakeholders. For public employees, it means strengthening their ability
to communicate their professional motivations, concerns and considerations to lay actors.
Finally, yet importantly, an enabling environment for social accountability enhances the
capacity of citizens and stakeholders to make well-informed, realistic and measured assess-
ments of what public authorities do and provide, thereby enhancing the ability of public
agencies to use the feedback to improve performance. Social accountability provides a
new type of dialogical accountability (Dillard and Vinnari 2019) as the critical judgement
of the accountability forum is provided in a dialogue between the account-giver and the
accountability forum. Sanctions do not involve the exercise of hard power such as political,
legal or economic sanctions. Sanctions primarily rely on soft power such as public criticism
problematizing the legitimacy of particular actions or the failure to take action. However,
such a criticism may be quite effective in democratic societies or when they are taken up
my particular branches of government capable of using hard power.
Some advocates tend to view social accountability as an alternative rather than a
supplement to the accountability mechanisms of representative government (see Joshi and
Houtzager 2012). This view is explained by the fact that the concept of social accountability
developed as a strategy for enhancing public accountability in developing countries with
limited horizontal and vertical accountability measures and large problems with corruption
and election fraud (Feruglio and Nisbett 2018; Fox 2015). Our claim, however, is that while
social accountability may provide an alternative failsafe in developing countries, it offers
a much-needed supplement to enhance public governance accountability in developed
Western democracies with elaborate systems of horizontal and vertical accountability,
which, as shown above, suffer from different limitations. Hence, building an enabling
environment that enhances the quality of the accountability-related exchanges between
public and private actors appears to offer a promising route to making public governance
accountability thicker and public governance more legitimate. What social accountability
adds to the existing accountability mechanisms in representative democracy is the idea that
accountability is improved if empowered public and civil society actors engage in an ongo-
ing dialogue about outputs and outcomes in a particular policy area of great importance
to both parties and use that dialogue to provide comprehensive, yet accessible accounts
of activities and results, solicit well-informed and precise feedback from a broad range of
actors with different backgrounds and perspectives, and learn from critical evaluations
and constructive suggestions.
Indeed, positive synergies between social, horizontal and vertical accountability that
secure quality exchanges in a context of transparency, oversight and effective sanctions ap-
pear to be particularly important in advanced liberal democracies in which the increasingly
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assertive citizens may not get what they want from government, voice their harsh criticisms
in the echo chambers of social media, and perhaps end up supporting authoritarian pop-
ulist parties and politicians who claim to side with the common man and wage war against
the establishment (Bartlett et al. 2011; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). This is the reality
in many ‘old’ liberal democracies that struggle to respond effectively and legitimately to
complex and turbulent policy problems, such as climate change, immigration, pandemics,
homelessness, drug abuse, poverty, unemployment and lifestyle-related illnesses under the
watchful and critical eye of old and new media, well-organized stakeholders and assertive
citizens (Sørensen 2020). Without the mutual understanding and accommodation that
grows out of ongoing high-quality exchanges between public authorities and relevant
and affected stakeholders, including users, citizens and civil society organizations, and
preferably in a context of horizontal and vertical checks, balances and controls, a further
decline in the trust in public authorities and perhaps even in the legitimacy of democratic
political systems is likely.
2.2. Collaborative Governance as an Enabling Environment
Since the turn of the century, collaborative governance has gained increasing recogni-
tion among governance researchers and public decision-makers for its ability to promote
the effectiveness, democratic legitimacy and innovative capacity of public governance
(Agger et al. 2015; Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Crosby and Bryson 2005; Emerson et al. 2012;
Stoker 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2017). Collaborative governance refers to processes and
structures that bring together relevant and affected public and private stakeholders from
different levels, sectors and organizations in a shared effort to solve governance problems
and produce public value (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). In the early
days, collaborative forms of governance were mainly perceived as a lender of last resort
when governance based on public hierarchies and private markets had failed. Nowadays,
they are increasingly seen as superior mechanisms for solving complex and turbulent gov-
ernance problems and as necessary instruments when the power, authority and resources
to govern are widely distributed across actors, sectors and levels (Ansell and Trondal 2018;
Bryson et al. 2015; Torfing et al. 2012). At present, collaborative governance arrangements,
such as networks and partnerships, are widely celebrated for their ability to stimulate
mutual learning and innovation in public policy and service delivery, to strengthen the
democratic legitimacy of public governance through inclusive and empowered participa-
tion, and to mobilize stakeholder resources to expand the reach of governance and get
things done (Bommert 2010; Sirianni 2010; Torfing 2016). However, much less attention
has been paid to the positive impact that collaborative governance may have on public
governance accountability. Indeed, governance researchers have mainly discussed the
negative impact of collaborative governance that stems from the many hands problem
(Bovens et al. 2008); that is, the problem of knowing exactly who was involved in making
a particular decision in a collaborative arena, and thus who to blame for governance fail-
ure. The neglect of the positive role that collaborative governance may have in boosting
public governance accountability is surprising, since collaborative governance allows a
broad range of societal actors to obtain first-hand knowledge of government affairs, debate
problems and solutions with responsible public actors, carefully evaluate processes and
outcomes, protest over unfair procedures and negative results, and bring critical issues to
the attention of the media.
To compensate for this benign neglect, we propose that collaborative forms of gover-
nance have the potential to serve as an enabling environment for the promotion of social
accountability and, thus, to thicken the otherwise thin public governance accountability in
advanced liberal democracies. Collaborative governance not only brings together relevant
and affected public and private stakeholders in a shared effort to govern society effectively,
democratically and innovatively. It also constructs a site for a well-informed, critical and
problem-focused scrutiny and assessment of public governance based on continuous in-
teraction and deliberation involving relevant and affected actors with both an interest in
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holding public authorities to account and who have sufficient resources and media access
to add teeth to their critical voices. Both public and private stakeholders are present in
the collaborative governance arenas, and there is sufficient time and space for the public
actors to explain themselves, present relevant material and to document results. For their
part, the private actors can ask questions, demand further documentation, voice their
opinion, debate solutions and results and, in retrospect, pass judgement on both process
and outcomes.
Trust-building and deliberation between public and private actors engaged in collab-
orative governance may construct accountability alliances seeking to promote ongoing
account-giving and scrutiny in order to enhance effective governance. Collaborative gov-
ernance is thus likely to stimulate the development of a shared understanding of past,
present and future governance solutions, including a critical inquiry into the actions and
intentions of public as well as private actors contributing to public value production in
the particular area. To illustrate, when a partnership of private businesses, trade unions
and local public actors are brought together to find a way of including disabled people or
traumatized refugees in the labor market, their efforts to find common ground will tend
to involve critical reflection on the existing government policy and ongoing practices that
may result in joint demand for explanations of the reason for upholding failing strategies
and political support for innovative strategies that rectify past problems and overcome
barriers to problem-solving. In the same vein, a network of politicians, administrators,
NGOs and local citizens aiming to accelerate the implementation of the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will not only seek to influence future policies and
actions. It will also engage in a critical assessment of how the government has hitherto
attempted to implement the SDGs, what the problems are, and how they can be solved.
The private stakeholders may voice criticisms of past and present undertakings and the
government actors may respond constructively by making concessions and proposing
new and better solutions; if not, the private stakeholders may draw public attention to
critical issues by contacting mass media or using social media to flag problems. Indeed,
collaborative governance may not merely facilitate account-giving and critical scrutiny,
but also stimulate mutual learning and prompt government to react to critical feedback
(Bovens et al. 2008; Brink and Wamsler 2018; Emerson and Gerlak 2014).
The accountability effect of collaborative governance may disappear if the private
actors are becoming responsible for co-managing and co-delivering government solutions
and thus lose their status as a relatively autonomous accountability forum. However, collab-
orative governance often involves external for-profit and non-profit actors in discussions
of the problem diagnosis and discussion of possible solutions, leaving the responsibil-
ity for authoritative decision-making and implementation to public agencies, which in
turn leaves considerable space for relevant and affected actors to critically scrutinize out-
puts and outcomes and to stimulate policy learning. Nevertheless, the accountability
effect is conditioned on the ability of collaborative governance arrangements to spur trust-
based deliberation between public and private actors with different interests, perspectives
and views.
As broadly recognized in theories of collaborative governance, it is far from cer-
tain that collaborative governance works well and fulfils its potential in terms of mak-
ing public governance more effective, democratic, innovative, etc. Successful collabo-
rative governance calls for strategic efforts to design a political and institutional frame-
work for collaborative interaction and to exercise a facilitative and integrative leadership
(Agranoff 2006; Ansell and Torfing 2021; Bason 2018; Bryson et al. 2006; Doberstein 2016;
Morse 2008; Page 2010). This kind of institutional framing and collaborative leadership
issometimes referred to as metagovernance, defined as the efforts to influence collaborative
processes without reverting too much to traditional forms of hierarchical imposition based
on command and control (Author). Metagovernance allows governments to orchestrate
and influence collaborative governance without undermining the relative autonomy of the
actors that motivates them to participate and invest in constructing a common ground for
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joint problem-solving. Metagovernance involves the governance of self-governance and
is typically performed through a combination of hands-off and hands-on tools (Author).
The former refers to the political, institutional, financial and discursive framing of self-
regulated collaboration, while the latter involves different forms of process management,
such as trust-building, the selective activation of participants and conflict mediation and
perhaps even the direct participation of meta-governors in order to set the agenda, clarify
the decision-making premises and drive the process to conclusion.
The metagovernance of collaborative governance is essential regardless of the col-
laborative objective, and is therefore also necessary when the goal is to promote social
accountability vis-à-vis public governance solutions. All of the relevant and affected actors
must be brought to the table and incentivized to share knowledge and information with
one another. Trust must be built to facilitate the critical scrutiny of past and present achieve-
ments and future plans, promote constructive dialogue, and stimulate mutual learning.
Leaders must facilitate and catalyze the development and testing of new solutions, mobilize
the participants in the implementation of new solutions and engage them in conversations
about results and impacts that contribute to making fair and measured assessments and
secure government responsiveness. A collaborative process is unlikely to foster critical,
yet balanced and measured, assessments of responses to an emerging health crisis such as
the recent pandemic if it does not involve health care staff, independent experts, patient
organizations and intensely affected citizen groups all together, and if it does not facilitate
public debate. This is achieved by carefully metagoverning the collaborative process. In
other words, it requires an active strategic effort on the part of public authorities to enhance
social accountability through collaborative governance; for example, by having national
authorities ensure that regional and local authorities respond to criticisms arising from
social and economic participants in collaborative governance (Schillemans 2008). The
precise form and content of metagovernance strategies for enhanced social accountability
is a topic for further research. Before moving on to propose a theoretical framework for
the empirical research of these matters, however, it is necessary to consider the fact that
collaborative governance is not only a part of the solution, but is also a part of the problem.
2.3. Holding Collaborative Governance Arenas to Account
As mentioned earlier, the participants in collaborative governance processes are often
sub-elites representing different groups of affected citizens. Their ability to act on behalf of
a broader group of citizens when engaging in collaborative governance and scrutinizing
past and present endeavors and future intentions is exactly what makes them valuable
components in an enabling environment for social accountability. However, the ability of
sub elites to exploit their stakeholder status to gain influence on public governance is also
what makes them dangerous, because it is difficult for the citizens and local communities
that they claim to represent to hold the sub-elites to account for the solutions they are
co-creating with government officials. Indeed, sub-elites are not merely playing the role as
critical watchdogs, but are also participating in the production of new solutions for which
they too will be responsible, and they might therefore be less critical and less interested in
accountability issues, the more responsibility they take for the final decisions. Hence, if
the sub-elites are ultimately op-opted by the governing elites that are metagoverning and
participating in the collaborative arenas, there will be an urgent need for holding the entire
collaboration to account for its actions and inaction.
Recent research clearly demonstrates the accountability deficit of networks, partner-
ships and other collaborative governance arenas (Damgaard and Lewis 2014; de Fine Licht
and Naurin 2016; Fox 2015; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014; Willems and Van Dooren 2011).
Hence, while collaborative governance may help to hold governments to account for gov-
ernance problems, including policy and regulation failures and poor service provision, the
collaborative governance themselves tend to be relatively opaque and secluded vis-à-vis
external actors, who are not directly represented in the collaborative arena. This heightens
the risk of the general public not knowing who participates, what is being discussed,
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what is decided, what are the results and impact, and who is to blame when collabo-
rative governance efforts go wrong. Moreover, the relative autonomy of collaborative
governance processes implies that public authorities have limited sanctioning powers at
their disposal, and the fact that the participants are often appointed rather than elected
(and sometimes even self-appointed) means that citizens cannot vote them out of office
(Benz and Papadopoulos 2006; O’Flynn and Wanna 2008; Papadopoulos 2007; Rose and
Sharfman 2014).
In much the same ways as collaborative governance enhances the social accountability
of government, social accountability may also enhance the accountability of collaborative
governance arrangements. Hence, a social accountability perspective suggests that the
route to holding collaborative forms of governance to account is to empower citizens, neigh-
borhoods and civic organizations by strengthening their political efficacy and capacity to
critically scrutinize and contest what they are told not only by political and administra-
tive elites, but also by sub-elites participating in collaborative governance arrangements
(Joshi and Houtzager 2012). In other words, the path forward to enhanced accountability
is to build a participatory culture and infrastructure in civil society. In such a participatory
culture, service users, affected citizens, NGOs, private businesses etc., have rights and
opportunities to speak out. They demand short, accessible and non-technical accounts
of the content and effectiveness of collaborative governance solutions, keep track of and
monitor what networks and partnerships are doing, and challenge them to explain and
justify their role in and the consequences of collaborative governance solutions. They may
also request that collaborative arenas engage with affected constituencies that are critical of
either the process or the results. Local media may support their efforts to hold collaborative
governance arenas to account for their actions by giving voice to criticisms, and public
meta-governors at higher levels may add teeth to their critical voices by demanding that the
collaborative arenas respond to public criticisms, correct mishaps and improve ill-devised
solutions (Schillemans 2008). As illustrated by a case study of collaborative governance
in the field of transport and mobility in Denmark, a participatory culture may urge local
partnerships and networks to account for their actions on websites, in local media and at
open meetings, all of which allows public scrutiny and critical judgement by those affected
by collaborative governance solutions. Some of the local network actors even went to Ger-
many to discuss the environmental consequences of a proposed bridge across the Fehmarn
Belt with skeptical German citizens and grassroot organizations (Torfing et al. 2009). It
takes time to develop a participatory culture in civil society that spurs participation in
collaborative governance while simultaneously urging collaborative governance arenas to
ensure the conditions for social accountability, and the societal conditions for such a cul-
ture to emerge may differ, depending on state and governance traditions (Vink et al. 2015;
Voorberg et al. 2017). The EU-financed research project TROPICO has developed a tool kit
that may support this process (https://tropico-project.eu/, accessed on 20 October 2021).
While some social accountability scholars primarily stress the need to encourage this
kind of bottom-up social accountability through the mobilization and empowerment of
local citizens, communities and movements (Joshi and Houtzager 2012), others stress the
importance of top-down measures to stimulate and support social accountability (Fox 2015;
Schillemans 2008). Hence, governments play a key role in creating a climate and infras-
tructure for promoting the social accountability of collaborative governance processes
and in stepping in to take action when citizens, local media or social communities reveal
problems relating to the process and outcomes of collaborative governance. Fox (2015)
usefully proposes a ‘sandwich strategy’ combining the bottom-up empowerment of citizens
and civil society with top-down government framing and stimulation of accountability.
Since top-down attempts to promote accountability in relation to collaborative gover-
nance arrangements can easily undermine the relative autonomy that motivates actors
to engage in collaborative governance, the devil lies in how to balance different forms
of metagovernance (Sørensen and Torfing 2009, 2017). The many contributions to the
literature on how to metagovern networks, partnerships and other collaborative forms
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of governance have much to offer in sketching out how this can be done (Kooiman 2003;
Meuleman 2008; Sørensen and Torfing 2009; Voets et al. 2015). Drawing on this literature, it
seems particularly promising for governments to use hands-off tools such as the design of
funding schemes for partnerships and networks that commit them to communicating their
activities and achievements to the public, together with hands-on tools such as facilitating
public meetings that bring together network participants and their local constituencies in
a critical exchange, focusing on problems, solutions and outcomes. Even a well-crafted
metagovernance of collaborative governance arenas cannot ensure their social account-
ability vis-à-vis affected constituencies since the dependence of local actors on public
finance and government regulation may undermine their independence and silence their
critical voices.
3. A Heuristic Conceptual Framework for Future Research and Prospective Analysis
The argument above has sought to justify two interrelated propositions. The first
proposition is that a strategic use of collaborative governance can contribute to making
public governance accountability thicker than is currently the case in advanced liberal
democracies by providing an enabling environment for social accountability. The second
is that social accountability can also help to hold rather externally secluded arenas of
collaborative governance involving a particular set of public decision-makers and private
sub-elites to account for their plans, doings and achievements. These propositions remain
largely untested (but see Cornwall and Shankland 2008; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006;
Torfing et al. 2009). Hence, there is an urgent need to further examine their feasibility
through comparative studies, explore under what conditions collaborative governance
enhances government accountability and collaborative governance arenas engages with af-
fected constituencies, and how the double impact of social accountability can be optimized
through metagovernance. Figure 1 draws the basic contours of a conceptual framework
that may guide empirical studies through the impact of collaborative governance as a form
of social accountability on government accountability and the impact of social accountabil-
ity on the accountability of collaborative governance arenas. The two-stage model also aims
to capture if and how government actors deploy metagovernance as a tool for ensuring
government accountability vis-à-vis-collaborative governance arenas and for advancing
social accountability in relation to collaborative governance processes.
The framework is heuristic in the sense that it provides the conceptual resources and
ideas needed to further investigate the connections between government, collaborative
governance and affected constituencies while paying attention to contextual factors and
adjusting the propositions based on learning and empirical discoveries. Hence, it does
not provide a detailed manual for analyzing the impact of collaborative governance on
public governance accountability and further studying the double impact of social account-
ability that helps to improve public governance accountability by linking government to
collaborative accountability forums while subsequently serving to ensure that collabora-
tive governance arenas are accountable to affected constituencies such as citizens, local
communities and civic organizations acting on their behalf.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for studying the double impact of social accountability on public
governance accountability.
The contribution of the two-stage model lies in its visualization of, first, the need
to analyze public governance accountability as an outcome of high-quality exchanges
between government officials and stakeholders participating in collaborative governance,
and, second, the need to facilitate interaction between the sub-elites involved in collabora-
tive governance and the affected constituencies they claim to represent (Saward 2010). The
conceptual framework thus draws attention to the fact that public governance accountabil-
ity is not merely ensured by traditional horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms
such as checks and balances and regular elections, as it also involves the construction of
an enabling environment for social accountability produced in and through collaborative
governance arrangements that are metagoverned by government. It also highlights the
accountability-relevant exchanges between collaborative governance arrangements and
relevant and affected citizens and civil society actors that may hold the collaborating
sub-elites to account and do so in the shadow of hierarchy, as public meta-governors may
help to empower citizens to demand and scrutinize accounts and encourage collaborative
arenas to provide accessible, non-technical accounts.
Based on the conceptual components and connections displayed in Figure 1, we
believe that studies of how collaborative governance can increase the answerability of
government and how civil constituencies can increase the accountability of collaborative
governance arenas may benefit from the following five steps:
The first step is to map the different forms of cross-boundary collaboration in relation
to a particular policy issue and governance process and assess whether the public and
private actors engage in a high-quality exchange wherein public actors get to explain them-
selves and private actors are able to question, scrutinize and pass judgement on both extant
policies (ex post accountability) and new, intended solutions (ex ante accountability). The
mapping of actors and their interrelations may draw on Social Network Analysis to estab-
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lish the pattern of interaction between the public and private actors (Knoke and Yang 2019),
but this analysis should be complemented by Policy Network Analysis aiming to deter-
mine the form and content of the interaction and in which part of the policy process the
interaction took place (Rhodes 2008). It will also be important to analyze the degree of
mutual trust and how it sustains an open, frank discussion about the perception of the
problem at hand, the course of action that has been or will be taken, and the ensuing or
likely results thereof (Klijn et al. 2010). Positive trust spirals where trust and high-quality
exchanges feed into each other may be detected.
The second step is to assess whether and how the collaborative exchange between
public decision-makers and private sub-elites leads to critical yet nuanced and measured
evaluations of government action and joint solutions and whether these evaluations result
in sanctions, such as naming and shaming and/or learning-based changes in public gover-
nance. Alternatively, problematic issues raised in and by collaborative governance arenas
may prompt action from the established system of vertical and horizontal accountability.
Analysis of the critical scrutiny of government action in collaborative settings may seek
to unravel whether participating stakeholders use policy evaluation as a means to hold
government to account, stimulate policy learning, or manipulate political opportunity
structures to their own advantage (Schoenefeld and Jordan 2019). It may also study the
conditions for government actors and external stakeholders to avoid engaging in uncon-
structive blame games that fail to provide accountability (Pellinen et al. 2018). Finally, the
analysis must pay attention to both the risk of arena capture by strong interest organiza-
tions and the risk of external stakeholders being too weak to go up against government
interests. Hence, analyzing shifting power relations is crucial.
The third step is to analyze how government agencies metagovern the relevant col-
laborative governance arenas in order to encourage and support their functioning as an
enabling environment for the production of social accountability (Jenkins 2014). Would-be
metagovernors can use hands-off tools to design an inclusive arena for collaborative gov-
ernance and frame it so as to include joint policy evaluation in the remit. They can also
use hands-on tools to build trust between public and private actors (Six et al. 2010) and
to insist that policy deliberation is both prospective and retrospective and is focused on
mutual learning. The motivations for government to enhance social accountability through
metagovernance may either be professional interest in policy learning or a wish to enhance
legitimacy by improving accountability. Other forms of motivations, or lack thereof, must
also be investigated.
The fourth step is to explore the extent to which collaborative governance arenas
produce publicly available, non-technical and comprehensive accounts that relevant and
affected citizens, communities and civil society organizations can access, question, scru-
tinize and voice their opinions about. Special attention should be paid to whether and
how civil constituencies are motivated to spend time evaluating processes and outcomes of
collaborative governance, how they engage in critical dialogue with the sub-elites involved
in collaborative governance, and how they can sanction instances of bad governance, which
might be a result of power inequalities and elite capture (McLaverty 2014) or a failure to
understand the needs and conditions on the ground (Ansell et al. 2017).
The final step is to study how public authorities, perhaps at the initiative of local
citizens, can support and strengthen the ability of citizens, local communities and civic
organizations to critically assess what is going on in collaborative governance arenas
and to demand compensatory or remedial action from governance networks if legitimate
rights and interests have been neglected or violated (Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg 2016).
The metagovernance of social accountability is important in the attempt to bolster local
communities to hold collaborative governance arenas to account, but we need to know
what tools are used and how effective they are.
The model and the five analytical steps not only reveal the double role of social
accountability in, first, enhancing the accountability of government and, subsequently,
in ensuring the accountability of collaborative governance arrangements. What is also
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revealed is the double role of metagovernance in, first, realizing the potential of collab-
orative governance to enhance government accountability and, subsequently, securing
the accountability of collaborative governance vis-à-vis local constituencies. The first
point is of great value for science and should include much more attention paid to social
accountability in the future. The second point is of great relevance to practitioners who
must assume responsibility for realizing the accountability potential of collaborative gover-
nance. Hitherto, metagovernance has mostly been discussed in relation to enhancing the
impact of collaborative governance on effective, democratic and innovative governance
(Sørensen and Torfing 2017). Now the concern for strengthening accountability through and
of collaborative governance must be added to the list of possible metagovernance goals.
4. Conclusions
Although traditional forms of horizontal and vertical accountability are crucial for
holding governments to account for their actions and inactions, they provide a thin form
of accountability, and recent efforts to enhance public control with what governments
do have not managed to silence the voices calling for a further strengthening of public
governance accountability. This article has argued that the principal–agent perspective that
has informed these accountability measures has little to offer when it comes to proposing
news ways of securing adequate account-giving and well-informed and balanced assess-
ments and effective responses. Although social accountability is mainly developed as
a strategy for improving accountability in the Global South, with weak or absent state
structures and failing democracies, we find that the social accountability perspective can
also inspire the enhancement of public governance accountability in Western countries with
well-institutionalized horizontal and vertical forms of accountability. Hence, intensifying
and improving the quality of the exchanges between public authorities and increasingly
competent and assertive citizens, neighborhoods and stakeholders may help create thicker
public governance accountability by means of supplementing the traditional forms of
democratic accountability with new forms of social accountability.
We have aimed to demonstrate that collaborative governance has the potential to serve
as an enabling environment for the promotion of social accountability. Moreover, we have
shown how collaborative forms of governance create their own accountability problems
that can be solved by adding a second loop of social accountability that seeks to hold the
collaborative governance arenas to account for their contribution to public problem solving.
Together, these arguments counter the traditional criticism of the accountability problems
associated with collaborative governance by highlighting its potential contribution to
enhancing government accountability.
Finally, we have argued that the contribution of collaborative governance to the
enhancement of supplementary forms of social accountability depends on metagovernance
and that local citizens, communities and civil society organizations that may want to
complain about the output and outcomes of collaborative governance can benefit from
supportive metagovernance from government actors who can add teeth to the critical
local voices.
All these arguments are captured by the two-stage model in Figure 1, which shows
how public governance accountability can be enhanced through a double-loop social
accountability model. The two stages of social accountability tend to make the contribution
of collaborative governance to public sector accountability uncertain, as many things can
go wrong. However, this is precisely why the model insists that metagovernance can play
a key role in supporting bottom-up forms of social accountability. The implication for
practitioners is clear: they must learn to metagovern collaborative governance processes
and to assume responsibility for realizing their potential contribution to strengthening
government accountability.
The double-loop social accountability model may serve as a heuristic device, guiding
much-needed empirical studies that may test whether and under what conditions the new
path to improved accountability is viable. Should empirical studies be affirmative, the
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questions will remain as to how to combine new and existing accountability mechanisms
and how to avoid their combination from resulting in accountability overload (Lewis and
Triantafillou 2012), although that is merely a problem for government and never for the
citizens aiming to hold elected government to account. In case empirical studies identify
examples of collaborative governance that are unhelpful in enhancing social accountability
and thickening accountability, we need to identify the barriers and work with practitioners
to conduct design experiments (Stoker and John 2009) to produce in situ knowledge of
what it takes for collaborative governance arrangements to focus on accountability and
enable affected groups of citizens to scrutinize their actions and inactions.
Government efforts to curb the COVID-19 crisis provide a highly relevant case for
testing the two-stage model in a study of government accountability (Leoni et al. 2021;
Rinaldi et al. 2020). In many Western countries, government actors have involved relevant
and affected societal actors in crisis management, and while this may have enhanced
dialogical accountability by allowing non-government actors to critically scrutinize the
actions and inactions of government, it raises the question of how such collaborative
governance arenas are held to account by wider society. This is exactly what the two-stage
model aims to capture and applying it in comparative studies will help to generate valuable
empirical experiences with its usage.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, E.S. and J.T.; methodology, E.S. and J.T.; software E.S. and
J.T.; validation, E.S. and J.T.; formal analysis, E.S. and J.T.; investigation, E.S. and J.T.; resources, E.S.
and J.T.; data curation, E.S. and J.T.; writing—original draft preparation, E.S. and J.T.; writing—review
and editing, E.S. and J.T.; visualization, E.S. and J.T.; supervision, E.S. and J.T.; project administration,
E.S. and J.T.; funding acquisition, E.S. and J.T. All authors have read and agreed to the published
version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by EU Horizon 2020 TROPICO grant # 726840.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
Agger, Annika, Bodil Damgaard, Andreas H. Krogh, and Eva Sørensen, eds. 2015. Collaborative Governance and Public Innovation in
Northern Europe. London: Bentham Science Publishers.
Agranoff, Robert. 2006. Inside Collaborative Networks: Ten Lessons for Public Managers. Public Administration Review 66: 56–65.
[CrossRef]
Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2003. Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press.
Alford, John. 2014. The Multiple Facets of Co-Production: Building on the Work of Elinor Ostrom. Public Management Review 16:
299–316. [CrossRef]
Ansell, Christoper, and Alison Gash. 2008. Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory 18: 543–71. [CrossRef]
Ansell, Christopher, and Jacob Torfing. 2021. Public Governance as Co-creation: A Strategy for Revitalizing the Public Sector and Rejuvenating
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ansell, C., E. Sørensen, and J. Torfing. 2017. Improving Policy Implementation through Collaborative Policymaking. Policy & Politics
45: 467–486.
Ansell, Christopher, and Jarle Trondal. 2018. Governing Turbulence: An Organizational-Institutional Agenda. Perspectives on Public
Management and Governance 1: 43–57. [CrossRef]
Ansell, Christopher, Carey Doberstein, Hayley Henderson, Saba Siddiki, and Paul ‘t Hart. 2020. Understanding Inclusion in
Collaborative Governance. Policy and Society 39: 570–91. [CrossRef]
Antlöv, Hans, and Anna Wetterberg. 2021. Deliberate and Deliver–Deepening Indonesian Democracy through Social Accountability. In
Deliberative Democracy in Asia. Edited by B. He, M. Breen and J. Fishkin. New York: Routledge, chapter 3.
Ashworth, Scott, Ethan B. de Mesquita, and Amanda Friedenberg. 2017. Accountability and Information in Elections. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9: 95–138. [CrossRef]
Adm. Sci. 2021, 11, 127 17 of 20
Attard, Judie, Fabrizio Orlandi, Simon Scerri, and Sören Auer. 2015. A Systematic Review of Open Government Data Initiatives.
Government Information Quarterly 32: 399–418. [CrossRef]
Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Bartlett, James, Jonathan Birdwell, and Mark Littler. 2011. The New Face of Digital Populism. London: Demos.
Bason, Christian. 2018. Leading Public Sector Innovation: Co-Creating for a Better Society. Bristol: Policy Press.
Behn, Robert D. 2001. Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Benz, Arthur, and Ioannis Papadopoulos, eds. 2006. Governance and Democracy: Comparing National, European and International
Experiences. Abingdon: Routledge.
Bianchi, Carmine, Greta Nasi, and William Rivenbark. 2021. Implementing Collaborative Governance: Models, Experiences, and
Challenges. Public Management Review. [CrossRef]
Bommert, Benjamin. 2010. Collaborative Innovation in the Public Sector. International Public Management Review 11: 15–33.
Bovens, Mark, and Anchrit Wille. 2020. Indexing Watchdog Accountability Powers a Framework for Assessing the Accountability
Capacity of Independent Oversight Institutions. Regulation & Governance 15: 856–76. [CrossRef]
Bovens, Mark, Thomas Schillemans, and Paul ‘t Hart. 2008. Does Public Accountability Work? An Assessment Tool. Public
Administration 86: 225–42. [CrossRef]
Bovens, Mark, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomass Schillemans, eds. 2014a. The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Bovens, Mark, Thomas Schillemans, and Robert E. Goodin. 2014b. Public Accountability. In The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability.
Edited by Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–22.
Breuer, Anita, and Julia Leininger. 2021. Horizontal Accountability for SDG Implementation: A Comparative Cross-National Analysis
of Emerging National Accountability Regimes. Sustainability 13: 7002. [CrossRef]
Brink, Ebba, and Christine Wamsler. 2018. Collaborative Governance for Climate Change Adaptation: Mapping Citizen–municipality
Interactions. Environmental Policy and Governance 28: 82–97. [CrossRef]
Brinkerhoff, Derick W., and Anna Wetterberg. 2016. Gauging the Effects of Social Accountability on Services, Governance, and Citizen
Empowerment. Public Administration Review 76: 274–86. [CrossRef]
Bryson, John M., Barbara C. Crosby, and Melissa M. Stone. 2006. The Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations:
Propositions from the Literature. Public Administration Review 66: 44–55. [CrossRef]
Bryson, John, Barbara C. Crosby, and Laura Bloomberg, eds. 2015. Creating Public Value in Practice: Advancing the Common Good in a
Multi-Sector, Shared-Power, No-One-Wholly-in-Charge World. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Burns, James M. 2003. Transforming Leadership. New York: Atlantic Monthly.
Candeub, Adam. 2013. Transparency in the Administrative State. Houston Law Review 51: 385–403.
Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2015. Performance and Accountability: A Theoretical Discussion and an Empirical Assessment.
Public Organization Review 15: 207–25. [CrossRef]
Christiano, Thomas. 2018. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. London: Routledge.
Clarke, Amanda, and Mary Francoli. 2014. What’s in a Name? A Comparison of ‘Open Government’ Definitions across Seven Open
Government Partnership Members. Journal of e-Democracy and Open Government 6: 248–66. [CrossRef]
Compton, Mallory, Scott Douglas, Lauren Fahy, Joannah Luetjens, Paul ‘t Hart, and Judith Van Erp. 2021. New Development: Walk on
the Bright Side—What Might We Learn about Public Governance by Studying its Achievements? Public Money & Management,
1–13. [CrossRef]
Cornwall, Andrea, and Alex Shankland. 2008. Engaging Citizens: Lessons from Building Brazil’s National Health System. Social
Science & Medicine 66: 2173–84.
Crosby, Barbara C., and John M. Bryson. 2005. Leadership for the Common Good. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Crosby, Barbara C., and John M. Bryson. 2010. Integrative Leadership and the Creation and Maintenance of Cross-Sector Collaborations.
The Leadership Quarterly 21: 211–30. [CrossRef]
Dalton, Russell J., and Christian Welzel, eds. 2014. The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Damgaard, Bodil, and Jenny Lewis. 2014. Citizen Participation in Public Accountability. In The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability.
Edited by M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin and T. Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 258–72.
de Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, and Christopher Warshaw. 2020. Accountability for the Local Economy at All Levels of Government in
United States Elections. American Political Science Review 114: 660–76. [CrossRef]
de Fine Licht, Jenny, and Daniel Naurin. 2016. Transparency. In Handbook on Theories of Governance. Edited by Chritopher Ansell and
Jacob Torfing. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 217–24.
De Montesquieu, Charles. 1989. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First published 1748.
Dillard, Jesse, and Eija Vinnari. 2019. Critical Dialogical Accountability: From Accounting-based Accountability to Accountability-based
Accounting. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 62: 16–38. [CrossRef]
Doberstein, Carey. 2016. Designing Collaborative Governance Decision-Making in Search of a ‘Collaborative Advantage’. Public
Management Review 18: 819–41. [CrossRef]
Douglas, Scott, Christopher Ansell, Charles F. Parker, Eva Sørensen, Paul ‘t Hart, and Jacob Torfing. 2020. Understanding Collaboration:
Introducing the Collaborative Governance Case Databank. Policy and Society 39: 495–509. [CrossRef]
Adm. Sci. 2021, 11, 127 18 of 20
Douglas, Scott, Thomas Schillemans, Paul ‘t Hart, Christopher Ansell, Lotte Bøgh Andersenc, Matthew Flinders, Brian Heade, Donald
Moynihanf, Tina Nabatchi, Janine O’Flynn, and et al. 2021. Rising to Ostrom’s Challenge: An Invitation to Walk on the Bright
Side of Public Governance and Public Service. Policy Design and Practice. [CrossRef]
Dubnick, Mel J. 2003. Accountability through Thick and Thin. East Lansing: Institute of Governance Public Policy and Social Research.
Dudley, Emma, Dinan Y. Lin, Matteo Mancini, and Jonathan Ng. 2015. Implementing a Citizen-Centric Approach to Delivering Government
Services. New York: McKinsey & Company.
Emerson, Kirk, and Andrea K. Gerlak. 2014. Adaptation in Collaborative Governance Regimes. Environmental Management 54: 768–81.
[CrossRef]
Emerson, Kirk, and Tina Nabatchi. 2015. Collaborative Governance Regimes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Emerson, Kirk, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh. 2012. An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 22: 1–29. [CrossRef]
Esmark, Anders. 2007. Democratic Accountability and Network Governance—Problems and Potentials. In Theories of Democratic
Network Governance. Edited by Eva Sørensen and Jacob Torfing. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 274–96.
Esser, Frank, and Jesper Strömbäck, eds. 2014. Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. 1993. The Elite Connection: Problems and Potential of Western Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fatemi, Mahboubeh, and Mohammad R. Behmanesh. 2012. New Public Management Approach and Accountability. International
Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences 1: 42–49.
Feruglio, Franscesca, and Nicholas Nisbett. 2018. The Challenges of Institutionalizing Community-level Social Accountability
Mechanisms for Health and Nutrition: A Qualitative Study in Odisha, India. BMC Health Services Research 18: 1–13. [CrossRef]
Fox, Jobathan A. 2015. Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say? World Development 72: 346–61. [CrossRef]
Freedom House. 2020. Government Accountability and Transparency. Downloaded. 2020. Available online: https://freedomhouse.
org/issues/government-accountability-transparency (accessed on 20 October 2021).
Fung, Archon. 2015. Putting the Public Back into Governance. Public Administration Review 75: 513–22. [CrossRef]
Gailmard, Sean. 2014. Accountability and Principal–Agent Theory. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability. Edited by Mark
Bovens, Robert E. Goodin and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 90–105.
Ghose, Rina. 2005. The Complexities of Citizen Participation through Collaborative Governance. Space and Polity 9: 61–75. [CrossRef]
Graves, Charles T., and Sonia K. Katyal. 2020. From Trade Secrecy to Seclusion. Georgetown Law Journal 109: 1337.
Grimes, Marcia. 2013. The Contingencies of Societal Accountability: Examining the Link between Civil Society and Good Government.
Studies in Comparative International Development 48: 380–402. [CrossRef]
Hardin, Russell. 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Held, David. 2006. Models of Democracy. Boston: Stanford University Press.
Hickey, Sam, and Sophie King. 2016. Understanding Social Accountability: Politics, Power and Building New Social Contracts. The
Journal of Development Studies 52: 1225–40. [CrossRef]
Hirst, Paul. 2000. Democracy and Governance. In Debating Governance. Edited by Jon Pierre. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 13–35.
Holbein, John B., and Hans J. Hassell. 2019. When your Group Fails: The Effect of Race-based Performance Signals on Citizen Voice
and Exit. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 29: 268–86. [CrossRef]
Honig, Dan, and Lant Pritchett. 2019. The Limits of Accounting-based Accountability in Education (and Far Beyond), Working Paper no. 510.
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
Hood, Christopher. 2010. The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Huxham, Chris, and Siv Vangen. 2013. Managing to Collaborate: The Theory and Practice of Collaborative Advantage. London: Routledge.
Ingham, Sean. 2019. Rule by Multiple Majorities: A New Theory of Popular Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacobs, Sandra, and Thomas Schillemans. 2016. Media and Public Accountability. Policy & Politics 44: 23–40.
Jenkins, Bryan R. 2014. Collaborative Governance and Accountability. Paper presented at the Annual Conference on Environment
Institute of Australia and New Zealand, Hobart, Australia, October 30–31.
Joshi, Devin K. 2013. The Protective and Developmental Varieties of Liberal Democracy: A Difference in Kind or Degree? Democratization
20: 187–214. [CrossRef]
Joshi, Anuradha, and Peter P. Houtzager. 2012. Widgets or Watchdogs. Public Management Review 14: 145–62. [CrossRef]
Keane, John. 2009. The Life and Death of Democracy. London: Simon & Schuster.
Kells, Stuart. 2011. The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing. Australian Accounting Review 21: 383–96. [CrossRef]
King, Desmond S. 1987. New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship. London: Macmillan International Higher Education.
Klijn, Erik-Hans. 2014. Political Leadership in Networks. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership. Edited by Rod A. W. Rhodes
and Paul ‘t Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 403–17.
Klijn, Erik-Hans, and Joop F. M. S. Koppenjan. 2014. Accountable Networks. In The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability. Edited by
Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 242–56.
Klijn, Erik Hans, Jurian Edelenbos, and Bram Steijn. 2010. Trust in Governance Networks: Its impacts on Outcomes. Administration &
Society 42: 193–221.
Knoke, David, and Song Yang. 2019. Social Network Analysis. London: Sage.
Adm. Sci. 2021, 11, 127 19 of 20
Kooiman, Jan. 2003. Governing as Governance. London: Sage.
Lægreid, Per. 2014. Accountability and New Public Management. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability. Edited by M. Bovens,
Robert E. Goodin and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 324–38.
Lane, Jan E., ed. 1997. Public Sector Reform: Rationale, Trends and Problems. London: Sage.
Leoni, Giulia, Alessamdro Lai, Riccardo Stacchezzini, Ilana Steccolini, Stephen Brammer, Martina Linnenluecke, and Istomi Demirag.
2021. Accounting, Management and Accountability in Times of Crisis: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic. Accounting,
Auditing and Accountability Journal 34: 1305–19. [CrossRef]
Lewis, Jenny M., and Peter Triantafillou. 2012. From Performance Measurement to Learning: A New Source of Government Overload?
International Review of Administrative Sciences 78: 597–614. [CrossRef]
Lindblom, Charles. 1979. Still Muddling, Not Yet Through. Public Administration Review 39: 517–26. [CrossRef]
Lührmann, Anna, Kyle L. Marquardt, and Valeriya Mechkova. 2020. Constraining Governments: New Indices of Vertical, Horizontal,
and Diagonal Accountability. American Political Science Review 114: 811–820.
Mattessich, Paul W., and Barbara R. Monsey. 1992. Collaboration: What Makes it Work. Opelousas: Amherst H. Wilder Foundation.
McLaverty, Peter. 2014. Inequality and Deliberative Democracy. In Deliberative Democracy: Issues and Cases. Edited by Stephen Elstub
and Peter McLaverty. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 34–49.
Meuleman, Louis. 2008. Public Management and the Metagovernance of Hierarchies, Networks and Markets. New York: Springer.
Morse, Ricardo S. 2008. Developing Public Leaders in an Age of Collaborative Governance. In Innovations in Public Leadership
Development. Edited by Ricardo S. Morse and Terry F. Buss. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 79–100.
Mudde, Cas, and Ceistóbal R. Kaltwasser, eds. 2012. Populism in Europe and the Americas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Neblo, Michael A., Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David M. Lazer, and Anond E. Sokhey. 2010. Who Wants to Deliberate—And
Why? American Political Science Review 104: 566–83. [CrossRef]
Norris, Pippa. 2011. Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2014. Watchdog Journalism. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability. Edited by M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin and T.
Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 525–44.
Nye, Joseph. 2008. The Powers to Lead. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Donnell, Gullermo. 1998. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. Journal of Democracy 9: 112–26. [CrossRef]
O’Flynn, Janine, and John Wanna. 2008. Collaborative Governance: A New Era of Public Policy in Australia. Canberra: ANU E Press.
Osborne, Stephen P. 2010. The New Public Governance? Abingdon: Routledge.
Page, Stephen. 2010. Integrative Leadership for Collaborative Governance. The Leadership Quarterly 21: 246–63. [CrossRef]
Papadopoulos, Yannis. 2007. Problems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel Governance. European Law Journal 13:
469–86. [CrossRef]
Park, Chang S. 2013. Does Twitter Motivate Involvement in Politics? Computers in Human Behavior 29: 1641–48. [CrossRef]
Pellinen, Jukka, Toni Mättö, Kari Sippola, and Atti Rautiainen. 2018. Blame Game or Dialogue? Accounting, Auditing and Accountability
Journal 31: 626–50. [CrossRef]
Peruzzotti, Enrique, and Catalina Smulovitz, eds. 2006. Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American
Democracies. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Pierre, Jon, B. Guy Peters, and Jenny de Fine Licht. 2018. Is Auditing the New Evaluation? International Journal of Public Sector
Management 31: 726–39. [CrossRef]
Power, Michael. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rhodes, Rod A. W. 2008. Policy Network Analysis. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Edited by Michael Moran, MMartin Rein
and Robert E. Gooding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 425–43.
Rinaldi, Leonardo, Charles H. Cho, Sumit K. Lodhia, Giovanna Michelon, and Carol A. Tilt. 2020. Accounting in Times of the COVID-19
Pandemic: A Forum for Academic Research. Accounting Forum 44: 180–83. [CrossRef]
Roberts, Nancy C. 2002. Keeping Public Officials Accountable through Dialogue: Resolving the Accountability Paradox. Public
Administration Review 62: 658–69. [CrossRef]
Rose, P., and B. S. Sharfman. 2014. Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance. Brigham Young
University Law Review. BYU L.Rev 1015. Available online: https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/
byulr2014&div=39&id=&page= (accessed on 20 October 2021).
Salamon, Lester M. 2002. The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Saward, Mchael. 2010. The Representative Claim. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schatz, Florian. 2013. Fighting Corruption with Social Accountability: A Comparative Analysis of Social Accountability Mechanisms’
Potential to Reduce Corruption in Public Administration. Public Administration and Development 33: 161–74. [CrossRef]
Schillemans, Thomas. 2008. Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies. Public Organization
Review 8: 175–94. [CrossRef]
Schillemans, Thomas. 2011. Does Horizontal Accountability Work? Evaluating Potential Remedies for the Accountability Deficit of
Agencies. Administration & Society 43: 387–416.
Schoenefeld, Jonas J., and Andrew J. Jordan. 2019. Environmental Policy Evaluation in the EU: Between Learning, Accountability, and
Political Opportunities? Environmental Politics 28: 365–84. [CrossRef]
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Adm. Sci. 2021, 11, 127 20 of 20
Shkabatur, Jennifer. 2012. Transparency with (out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States. Yale Law & Policy Review
31: 80–159.
Sirianni, Carmen. 2010. Investing in Democracy: Engaging Citizens in Collaborative Governance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Six, Fédérique, Bart Nooteboom, and Adriaan Hoogendoorn. 2010. Actions that Build Interpersonal Trust. Review of Social Economy 68:
285–315. [CrossRef]
Stoker, Gerry. 2006. Public Value Management: A New Narrative for Networked Governance? The American Review of Public
Administration 36: 41–57. [CrossRef]
Stoker, Gerry, and Peter John. 2009. Design Experiments: Engaging Policy Makers in the Search for Evidence about What Works.
Political Studies 57: 356–73. [CrossRef]
Sørensen, Eva. 1997. Democracy and Empowerment. Public Administration 75: 553–567. [CrossRef]
Sørensen, Eva. 2020. Interactive Political Leadership: The Role of Politicians in the Age of Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sørensen, Eva, and Jacob Torfing. 2009. Making Governance Networks Effective and Democratic through Metagovernance. Public
Administration 87: 234–258. [CrossRef]
Sørensen, Eva, and Jacob Torfing. 2017. Metagoverning collaborative innovation in governance networks. The American Review of Public
Administration 47: 826–839. [CrossRef]
Sørensen, Eva, and Jacob Torfing. 2020. Radical and Disruptive Answers to Downstream Problems in Collaborative Governance. Public
Management Review. accepted for publication..
Torfing, Jacob. 2016. Collaborative Innovation in the Public Sector. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Torfing, Jacob, B.Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and Eva Sørensen. 2012. Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Torfing, Jacob, Eva Sørensen, and Trine Fotel. 2009. Democratic Anchorage of Infrastructural Governance Networks: The Case of the
Femern Belt Forum. Planning Theory 8: 282–308. [CrossRef]
V-DEM Institute. 2021. Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report. 2021. Gothenburg: The V-DEM Institute, University of
Gothenburg.
Vink, Martinus J., D. Woodrow Benson, Daan Boezeman, Heather Cook, Art R. P. J. Dewulf, and C. J. A. M. Termeer. 2015. Do State
Traditions Matter? Journal of Water and Climate Change 6: 71–88. [CrossRef]
Voets, Joris, Koen Verhoest, and Astrid Molenveld. 2015. Coordinating for Integrated Youth Care: The need for smart metagovernance.
Public Management Review 17: 981–1001. [CrossRef]
Voorberg, William, Victor Bekkers, Sophie Flemig, Krista Timeus, Piret Tonurist, and Lars Tummers. 2017. Does Co-Creation Impact
Public Service Delivery? The Importance of State and Governance Traditions. Public Money & Management 37: 365–72.
Wæver, Ole. 1993. Securitization and Desecuritization. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research.
Warren, Mark E. 2011. Voting with Your Feet: Exit-Based Empowerment in Democratic Theory. American Political Science Review 105:
683–701. [CrossRef]
Warren, Mark E. 2014. Accountability and Democracy. In The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability. Edited by Mark Bovens, Robert E.
Goodin and Thomas Schillemans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–54.
White, L. A. 2002. The Need for Governmental Secrecy. Virginia Journal of International Law 43: 1071.
Whiteley, Paul, and Ann-Kristin Kölln. 2019. How Do Different Sources of Partisanship Influence Government Accountability in
Europe? International Political Science Review 40: 502–17. [CrossRef]
Willems, Tom, and Wouter Van Dooren. 2011. Lost in Diffusion? How Collaborative Arrangements Lead to an Accountability Paradox.
International Review of Administrative Sciences 77: 505–30. [CrossRef]
